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Abstract
We extend standard Pareto criterion for welfare ranking in terms
of inequality. We suggest strongly Pareto superior or SPS allocations
which are inequality neutral but guarantee higher welfare for everyone.
The purpose is to entertain the idea that rising inequality is a major
welfare concern and hence one must go beyond standard Pareto supe-
rior (PS) allocations that necessarily lead to greater inequality. In the
main result of this paper we show that whenever there is aggregate
gain in net utility then there exists counterfactual allocation which is
eventually a SPS allocation.
1 Introduction
Pareto ranking or Pareto efficiency is a topic economists are exposed to very
early in their career. In particular the basic welfare comparison between two
social situations starts with the ranking in terms of a principle Pareto have
talked about in the nineteenth century. If we compare two social situations
A and B, we say B is Pareto superior to A iff everyone is as well of in B
as in A and at least one is strictly better off in situation B compared to A.
This comparison is done in terms of utility or welfare levels individuals enjoy
in A and B. Theory of social welfare has been a widely discussed topic with
seminal contributions from De Scitovszky (1941), Samuelson (1958), Arrow
(1963) and others to make recent treatments such as Cowels () Stiglitz (1987)
Sen (1970).
Pareto’s principle provides a nice way to compare situations when some
gain and some lose by considering whether transfer from gainers to losers can
lead to a new distribution in B such that B turns out to be Pareto superior
to A, the initial welfare distribution. It is obvious that if sum of utilities
increases in B relative to A, then welfare be the actual distribution in B,
a transfer mechanism will always exist such that transfer-induced redistri-
bution will make B Pareto superior to A. The great example is how gains
from international trade can be redistributed in favor of those who lose from
trade such that everyone gains due to trade. Overall gains from trade lead to
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a highly level of welfare, under ideal conditions and therefore one can show
that under free trade eventually nobody may lose as gainers ‘bribe’ the losers.
But whatever it is Pareto ranking definitely does not address the inequality
issue. There will be situations where B will be Pareto superior to A, but
inequality in B can be much greater than A. The purpose of this short paper
is to extend the basic principle of Pareto’s welfare ranking subjecting it to a
stricter condition that keeps the degree of inequality intact between A and B
after transfer from gainers to losers, but at the same time guaranteeing that
everyone gains in the end.
Thus we coin a Strong-Pareto criterion which not only insists that ev-
eryone must be better of in B compared to A, but also requires that degree
of inequality must remain the same between A and B. Only then B will be
Strongly Pareto Superior (SPS) to A. Concern for such a Strong principle
stems from the fact that people do care about inequality and inequality has
become a worldwide popular point of debate in public domain (see Stewart,
2004; Stiglitz, 2012; Piketty, 2014; Atkinson and Stiglitz, 2015; Pickett and
Wilkinson, 2015, for further readings).
Pareto superior move as such may not contain agitation to change policies
further because of rising inequality. We are also motivated by the query as
do whether the basic condition that guarantees Pareto superiority of B to A,
would also guarantee that B is SPS to A. Apparently it need not be since
there can be transfer that make B PS A, but that aggravate inequality.
We show that if total utility in B is grater than total utility of A, we
can always construct a counterfactual distribution C which is SPS to A. The
counterfactual allocation is obtained by taxing a subset of individual and
redistributing the collected tax to the rest of the individuals. In order to keep
the inequality level same we redistribute the aggregate gains proportionate
to that of individuals utility at the initial stage.
Section 2 describes the environment and the result. Last section con-
cludes.
2 Model
Consider an n (n > 1) agent society being observed for two time points. The
initial time point is denoted by 0, whereas the final time point is denoted by
1. The utility profile for the set of individuals at time t(t ∈ {0, 1}) is defined
in the following fashion:
Ut = {ut1, ut2, ..., utn}, ∀t ∈ {0, 1} (1)
We assume that the individual utilities are cardinal. Furthermore, we also
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assume that the individual utilities are also strictly positive, i.e. uti > 0, ∀t ∈
{0, 1} and ∀i ∈ {1, 2, .., n}.1 Let Dn be the set of all such n coordinated utility
profiles.
Pareto superiority (PS) is defined as the situation where no one looses
from the initial to the final period but at least one individual gains. However,
PS allocation may aggravate inequality. We thus introduce “Strong Pareto
Superiority” (SPS). By SPS we mean a situation where the utility of all
the individuals increases and the inequality also remains same, compared
to that of the initial distribution. Throughout this paper by inequality we
restrict our attention to the family of relative inequality indices of the form
I : Dn −→ R which are homogeneous of degree 0, i.e.,
I(u1, u2, .., un) = I(δu1, δu2, .., δun) (2)
where δ > 0.
We now formally define SPS allocations in the following fashion:
Definition 1. SPS allocation For all U0, U1 ∈ Dn, any counterfactual
distribution Uˆ = {uˆ1, uˆ2, .., uˆn} ∈ Dn which is obtained from U1 is said to be
a SPS allocation to U0 which is denoted by Uˆ SPS U0, if and only if uˆi > u0i
and u0i
u0j
= uˆi
uˆj
, ∀i, j ∈ {1, 2, .., n}.
Note that if we scale up utilities of all the individual’s of the initial dis-
tribution by any positive scalar greater than 1, we necessarily get a SPS
allocation. Nevertheless, such an allocation is not feasible if the aggregate
utility of the counterfactual distribution exceeds that of the final distribution.
Formally we define a feasible SPS allocation in the following fashion:
Definition 2. Feasible SPS allocation: For all U0, U1 ∈ Dn, and ∃Uˆ =
{uˆ1, uˆ2, .., uˆn} ∈ Dn which is obtained from U1 such that Uˆ SPS U0, then Uˆ
is said to be a feasible SPS allocation if and only if
n∑
i=1
uˆi ≤
n∑
i=1
u1i.
A feasible SPS allocation may not be the most efficient. This is partic-
ularly when there is some resource left as a residual which can be further
redistributed amongst the agents to make every one better off. We define
the most efficient SPS allocation, among the set of feasible SPS allocations
in the following fashion:
1We make this assumption for mathematical simplicity. We can always allow an utility
function which takes negative values. However, in such cases we have to restrict the class
of utilities that are invariant to any change in the origin of the utility function’s.
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Definition 3. Most efficient SPS allocation: For all U0, U1 ∈ Dn, and
∃Uˆ = {uˆ1, uˆ2, .., uˆn} ∈ Dn which is obtained from U1 such that Uˆ SPS U0,
then Uˆ is said to be the most efficient SPS allocation if and only if Uˆ is a
feasible SPS allocation and Uˆ is Pareto superior to any other feasible SPS
allocation.
Our next result shows a necessary and sufficient condition for any feasible
SPS allocation to become the most efficient SPS allocation. Formally,
Lemma 1. For all U0, U1 ∈ Dn, and ∃Uˆ = {uˆ1, uˆ2, .., uˆn} ∈ Dn which is
obtained from U1 such that Uˆ SPS U0, then Uˆ is the most efficient SPS
allocation if and only if
n∑
i=1
uˆi =
n∑
i=1
u1i.
Proof: We prove both the if and the only part considering method of
contradiction.
Only if
Let
n∑
i=1
uˆi 6=
n∑
i=1
u1i. Now if
n∑
i=1
uˆi >
n∑
i=1
u1i the SPS allocation is infeasible,
hence Uˆ is not the most efficient. On the other hand if
n∑
i=1
uˆi <
n∑
i=1
u1i, we
can always construct another feasible SPS allocation Zˆ = {zˆ1, zˆ2, .., zˆn} ∈ Dn
where zˆi = uˆi +
( n∑
i=1
u1i−
n∑
i=1
uˆi
n∑
i=1
u0i
)
u0i. Clearly Zˆ is Pareto superior to Uˆ .
If
We begin with the assumption that there exists a feasible Vˆ = {vˆ1, vˆ2, .., vˆn} ∈
Dn such that vˆi = uˆi + κ.u0i where κ > 0. Clearly both Vˆ and Uˆ are SPS
allocations and Vˆ is Pareto superior to Uˆ . Since Vˆ is feasible, this implies
n∑
i=1
vˆi ≤
n∑
i=1
u1i =⇒
n∑
i=1
(
uˆi + κ.u0i
)
≤
n∑
i=1
u1i. Now given κ > 0 =⇒
n∑
i=1
uˆi <
n∑
i=1
u1i which is a contradiction. Q.E.D.
We are now ready to introduce the main result of this paper. By SPS
allocations we mean a counterfactual distribution which has same inequality
as the initial distribution and also is Pareto superior to the initial distribu-
tion. Obviously such a distribution will never exist if there is aggregate loss
in the society. This is because the net loss must make at least one individual
worse off and eventually there does not exist any feasible Pareto Superior
allocation. However, if there is net gain a SPS allocation can be obtained
by taxing a subgroup of individual and transferring the collected tax to the
rest of the population. Our next result characterizes the tax-transfer vector
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that can be associated with a most efficient SPS allocation, in the following
fashion:
Proposition 1. For all U0, U1 ∈ Dn, ∃Uˆ = {uˆ1, uˆ2, .., uˆn} ∈ Dn which is
obtained from U1 such that Uˆ SPS U0 and Uˆ is the most efficient SPS
allocation, if and only if
n∑
i=1
u1i >
n∑
i=1
u0i and the tax-transfer vector is T =
{T1, T2, .., Tn} = {u11−uˆ1, u12−uˆ2, .., u1n−uˆn}, where Ti = u1i−u0i
( n∑
i=1
u1i
n∑
i=1
u0i
)
, ∀i ∈
{1, 2, .., n}.
Proof: Only if
Given Uˆ SPS U0 =⇒ ∃θ such that uˆi = θ.u0i ∀i ∈ {1, 2, .., n} and θ > 1.
Now Uˆ is most efficient SPS =⇒
n∑
i=1
uˆi =
n∑
i=1
u1i =⇒ .
θ =
n∑
i=1
u1i
n∑
i=1
u0i
(3)
Now θ > 1 =⇒
n∑
i=1
u1i >
n∑
i=1
u0i. Putting uˆi = θu0i = u0i
n∑
i=1
u1i
n∑
i=1
u0i
in the
elements of T , (i.e., Ti = u1i − uˆi), we can write Ti = u1i − u0i
( n∑
i=1
u1i
n∑
i=1
u0i
)
.
If
Given Ti we can write
uˆi = u0i.
( n∑
i=1
u1i
n∑
i=1
u0i
)
(4)
Furthermore, it is also given that
n∑
i=1
u1i >
n∑
i=1
u0i =⇒ uˆi > u0i. Since, 4
is satisfied implies the distributions Uˆ and U0 have same inequality, following
any relative inequality measure satisfying property 2. Furthermore, from
equation 4 we have
n∑
i=1
uˆi =
n∑
i=1
u1i Combining these three arguments it is
straightforward to write that Uˆ SPS U0 and Uˆ is also most efficient. Q.E.D.
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The tax transfer vector for the construction of the SPS allocation is in-
finite. However, it is unique for the most efficient SPS allocation. This is
illustrated formally in our next result.
Proposition 2. Given Proposition 1, the most efficient SPS allocation Uˆ
and the associated Tax transfer vector T is unique.
Proof: We begin with the assumption that there exists any arbitrary T˜ =
{T˜1, T˜2, .., T˜n} ∈ Rn and a counterfactual distribution Vˆ = {vˆ1, vˆ2, ..., vˆn} =
{u11 − T˜1, u12 − T˜2, .., u1n − T˜n} ∈ Dn, such that T˜ 6= T and Vˆ is also a most
efficient SPS allocation. Now any two vectors of the same order are related
in the following fashion: T˜ = T +  where  = {1, 2, .., n} ∈ Rn. Since T 6=
T˜ =⇒ ∃i ∈ {1, 2, .., n} such that i 6= 0. Clearly, inequality in Vˆ is same as
U0 following 2 if and only if ∃α(α ∈ R) such that i = αu0i, ∀i ∈ {1, 2, .., n}.
Hence we can write vˆi = u0i.
(
θ− α
)
, where θ =
n∑
i=1
u1i
n∑
i=1
u0i
. Clearly if α > 0 the
allocation is a feasible SPS but is not the most efficient. On the other hand if
α < 0 then
n∑
i=1
vˆi >
n∑
i=1
u1i =⇒ the allocation is not feasible and eventually
is not the most efficient. Hence, α = 0 =⇒ T ≡ T˜ and Uˆ ≡ Vˆ . Q.E.D.
3 Conclusion
We have extended the basic Pareto principle to focus on inequality-neutral or
distribution neutral Pareto superior allocation which we call strongly Pareto
superior or SPS allocation which guarantees higher individual welfare keeping
the degree of inequality same as before. We have shown that whenever there
is aggregate gain in the society we can compute a counterfactual distribution
obtained by taxing a subgroup of population and redistributing the collected
tax to the rest of the population such that the counterfactual allocation is
a SPS allocation. In the counterfactual distribution the aggregate gains of
utility has been redistributed among the individuals in the proportionate to
their utilities of the initial distribution. This keeps the inequality level same
and also ensures that the SPS is feasible and is the most efficient one.
A future research problem in this direction is to compare inequality be-
tween the counterfactual and the final distributions.
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